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Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, a wholly new strand of literature emerged with the goal of measuring systemic risk. 1 These measures can broadly be divided into two categories: (1) macroprudential measures with the goal of measuring the systemic risk of the entire financial system, and (2) microprudential measures which have the goal of identifying the individual contribution of companies to the overall systemic risk of the financial system.
The four most relevant sophisticated microprudential measures are: CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) , Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2010; Corvasce, 2013) , SRISK (Acharya et al., 2012) , 2 and Granger-Causality Networks (Billio et al., 2012) . 3 Besides these attempts to develop systemic risk measures, there is also the contrasting view in in the literature that systemic risk measures, with an increasing degree of sophistication, have some shortfalls. More specifically, the application of sophisticated systemic risk measures is difficult; hence, they lack transparency (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011) . Therefore, sophisticated measures might not necessarily be the best choice for identifying and regulating systemically relevant institutions. Consequently, simple measures might be more suitable (see, for example, Pottier and Sommer, 2002; Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011; Haldane, 2012; Patro et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013) . This paper evaluates whether sophisticated or simple systemic risk measures are more suitable in indicating which companies contribute to systemic risk. In a first approach, I examine the explanatory power of various measures with respect to governmental support received during the financial crisis of 2008. My analysis is based on U.S. companies listed in the S&P 500 composite index in 2007. In a second approach, I investigate which measures correctly predict companies that were recently labeled systemically important. The analysis is based on U.S. companies listed in the S&P 500 composite index in 2013.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, this is the first empirical comparison of sophisticated and simple systemic risk measures by means of a benchmark approximating systemic risk. Other studies usually either only provide rankings (Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013; Huang et al., 2012) or only test sophisticated systemic risk measures (Idier et al., 1 An overview of the various measures is provided by Bisias et al. (2012) . 2 SRISK is not an acronym, but the name of the systemic risk measure indicating how much capital a company needs in a future crisis. 4
Methodology
This paper empirically evaluates whether sophisticated or simple systemic risk measures are more suitable to identify institutions which contribute to systemic risk. Therefore, I regress the systemic relevance of institutions on sophisticated and simple systemic risk measures. The suitability of measures is finally interpreted according to the significance of the results and the model fit.
The systemic relevance of companies is approximated via two different approaches. The first approach focuses on the receipt of financial support during the financial crisis and leads to two different dependent variables. A dichotomous variable is created by taking into account whether financial support is received, and a cardinal variable, by focusing on the amount of received financial support. The second approach takes into account the institutions which are classified as systemically important institutions (SII) in 2013 and leads to a dichotomous variable. 9 Consequently, there will be two dummy variables approximating systemic relevance: the reception of financial support and the classification as SII by national or international supervisors. The extent of the systemic relevance of an institution will be approximated by the amount of financial support the institution received. These three variables are used as dependent variables in the regression analyses. This approach follows Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014, p. 109) , who "define the most systemically important insurers as those companies that required aid under TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program]". 10 For the first approach, the following programs are considered, all of which target individual institutions to ensure financial stability or to reduce systemic risk: Two different samples are used in the analyses. The first approach is based on the companies included in the S&P 500 composite index as of January 2007. The second approach is based on S&P 500 companies as well, but in contrast, as a reference point, January 2013 is considered. 10 In addition, see Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) As mentioned previously, there is a variety of microprudential sophisticated systemic risk measures. In this paper, CoVaR, MES, SRISK and Granger Causality Networks are applied, since they are considered the most relevant by the literature. In addition, they cover a wide field of different approaches to systemic risk (Neale, 2012; Benoit et al., 2013; Balla et al., 2014; Eling and Pankoke, 2014; Jobst, 2014) The simple systemic risk measures used in this paper are motivated by Haldane (2012) , in the case of leverage, as well as by Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) , in the case of size. Another reason why size has to be included in the analyses is provided by the too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
literature. Brewer III and Jagtiani (2013) for example examine mergers of banks in the U.S.
between 1991 and 2004 and define a TBTF institution as one with total book value assets in excess of $100 billion. They find that between $15 billion and $23 billion premiums have been paid more for mergers which resulted in a TBTF institution than for mergers which resulted in smaller companies. Therefore, markets assume implicitly that size determines systemic risk, because TBTF institutions are only bailed out due to their impact on financial stability.
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The motivation for using stock market returns as a simple systemic risk measure is based on the calculation of MES (Acharya et al., 2010) . The MES of a company considers the stock market returns, but only considers the returns of a company when the entire market is in a slump. However, previous studies have not tested if the "tail returns" considered by MES do have more explanatory power ex ante than stock market returns. The same logic applies to the linear correlation between the stock market returns of a company and the returns of the entire market. Many researchers argue that correlation should play an important part in the design of any systemic risk measure. For example, Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) use
Granger-Causality Networks to access systemic risk. In particular, Balla et al. (2014) argue that the tail correlations between different entities should be considered. The Pearson 12 See FSB (2013a), FSB (2013b) and FSOC (2013) . The FSB is an international organization that was established by the G-20 in April 2009. Its purpose is to monitor the finance industry and to make recommendations for addressing systemic risk. The FSOC is a committee chaired by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and an insurance expert appointed by the U.S. President. Its purpose is to identify threats to the stability of the financial system. 13 See Brewer III and Jagtiani (2013) for additional evidence that TBTF institutions are only bailed out because of their impact on financial stability.
6 correlation should not be such a good indicator since the goal is to focus on spillover effects and not to focus on general co-movements in the market. Nevertheless, Patro et al. (2013) propose the Pearson correlation as a simple systemic risk measure. In an empirical application they show for 22 large U.S. banks that during times of crisis overall correlation spikes and seems to be a useful systemic risk measure.
An overview of the variables and their expected relationships can be found in Table 1 . Goal of classification is to indicate institutions which can contribute to a systemic crisis (see, e.g., IAIS, 2013, p. 6).
Independent Variables -Sophisticated Systemic Risk Measures CoVaR
Systemic risk measure which considers the entire contribution of a company to systemic risk (Section 2.1). The smaller the CoVaR, the higher the systemic risk contribution.
For an institution to be in distress at the same time as the market is a sign of a high contribution to systemic risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) .
MES
Systemic risk measure which focuses on the stock market returns of an institution during a crisis (Section 2.2). The smaller the MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall), the higher the systemic risk contribution.
Does not focus on the contribution of an institution to the probability of a systemic crisis, but on its impact on the severity (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2010) .
SRISK
Systemic risk measure which determines how much capital in million USD an institution needs if a crisis occurs (Section 2.3).
Advancement of MES which takes debt into account and is supposed to be forward looking. Does not take the probability of a crisis into account (Acharya et al., 2012) .
GrangerOut
Systemic risk measure which takes Granger-causality relationships between the stock market returns of institutions into account (Section 2.4). The more interconnections, the higher the systemic risk contribution.
The focus lies on the interconnections within a system. Institutions which are highly interconnected are considered to contribute strongly to systemic risk (Billio et al., 2012) .
Independent Variables -Simple Systemic Risk Measures
Size
Natural logarithm of market capitalization in million USD.
On the one hand, size increases impact in the case of bankruptcy (see, e.g., FSB, 2009; Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011) . On the other hand, size as an indicator ignores aligned behavior (see, e.g. Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) . Debt is an alternative measure for the size of a company.
Debt
Natural logarithm of total debt in million USD.
Leverage
Market leverage: total debt / market capitalization.
Leverage (Leverage and Book) increases the vulnerability of a company in adverse market situations. Increased forecasting power of leverage for bank bankruptcies is assumed (Haldane, 2012) .
Book
Book leverage: total debt / total assets.
Return
One year stock market return of the company.
MES and SRISK approximate tail returns. The question is if simple stock market returns are sufficient to determine companies which contribute to systemic risk.
Correlation
Linear correlation between the stock market returns of a company and the market index.
CoVaR and Granger-Causality Networks both approximate the interconnectedness between companies (see, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Billio et al., 2012) . Correlation is a simpler approach to assess the interconnections. The question is if it is viable. Table 1 : Description of dependent and independent variables used in the regression analyses.
CoVaR
CoVaR is a risk measure based on Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) . Its general idea is to measure the value at risk (VaR) of a market, conditional on the state of a certain institution.
Hence, it measures the contribution of an institution to systemic risk.
CoVaR q indicates the difference between the VaR 0.5 of a market, conditional on an institution at its VaR 0.5, and the VaR q of a market, conditional on an institution at its VaR q .
Weekly stock market returns can be used to calculate the CoVaR if the focus only lies on the risk of adverse asset price movements. If funding liquidity risk should also be captured, weekly market-valued total asset prices should be used.
As suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , I use quantile regressions to derive CoVaR. To calculate the CoVaR measure, I use the quantile regression:
where:
| is the estimateduantile of returns of the entire market, conditional on institution i. are the returns of institution i. is the estimated constant and the estimated coefficient for institution i. Since theuantile of the market is equivalent to the VaR q level:
CoVaR q is then generated by only considering the case where , as in Equation (3). Finally, CoVaR as applied in this paper, is the difference between the CoVaR of the system at a 1% level and the CoVaR of the system at a 50% level. I choose 1%, to replicate the measure CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) as close as possible.
14 Mathematically, CoVaR is described in Equation (4).
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The growth rate of the market-valued total asset prices is generated as:
where: indicates the growth rate of the market-valued total assets of company i at time t.
denotes the market value of company i's equity value at time t (measured by total market capitalization). denotes the book value of company i's total debt.
MES
The MES is a systemic risk measure introduced by Acharya et al. (2010) . The general idea is to measure the expected magnitude of a crisis. Therefore, the measure focuses on the expected contribution of an institution to the aggregated capital loss during a crisis but not on the probability of a systemic crisis to occur.
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The MES of a company is simply the weighted average of the company's historical stock market returns during the time when the entire market is in distress. The MES of a company is defined as:
% indicates the MES of company i, conditional on the 5% worst trading days of the market in the last year.
16
I choose 5% to replicate the measure MES by Acharya et al. (2010) as close as possible.
denotes the equity value of company i at time t and % is an indicator function, denoting the 5% worst market outcomes. The time invariant MES, in this paper considers only the last year of the stock market movements. The applied calculation in this paper is:
% stands for the MES at time t and %, is an indicator function for the 5% worst market returns during the last 261 trading days. 15 The fact that the MES focuses on the expected magnitude, and not on the probability of a crisis, is often neglected in the literature (Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013) . For the analysis in this paper MES is fine since both aspects contribute to the systemic relevance of an institution. An institution can contribute to systemic risk by either increasing the probability or the magnitude of a crisis. 16 Robustness tests for the 1% and 10% worst trading days are conducted as well. Results do not offer further insights and are displayed in Table 13 and Table 14 in the Appendix.
SRISK
SRISK is a systemic risk measure developed by Acharya et al. (2012) and is related to MES. It is a measure for the expected capital shortfall of a company, given a crisis, and indicates how much additional capital is needed by a company to stay solvent during the next crisis. SRISK can be seen as a substitute for stress tests.
The major advancement of SRISK over MES is that it takes the total debt of a company into account and is supposed to be forward looking. However, as MES, SRISK does not account for the probability of a crisis to occur. SRISK is defined as:
|Crisis (8) where: indicates the expected capital shortfall of a company i at a time t given a crisis. Crisis is an indicator function, denoting the presence of a crisis. Acharya et al. (2012) suggests measuring the expected capital shortfall of a company via simulated equity returns and the crisis via a broad stock market index, which is simulated for six months in the future.
Whenever it falls by more than 40%, this is viewed as a crisis. As Acharya et al. 
where: k stands for the capital ratio (equity as a fraction of total liabilities), which I assume to be 8%, as in Acharya et al. (2012) . indicates the total book value of debt and is the market value of equity, whereas i stands for the company and t indicates the time.
indicates the Long Run MES and is approximated by 1 * , whereas represents the MES, as in Section 2.2. Billio et al. (2012) propose Granger-Causality Networks to measure interconnectedness and systemic risk. The underlying idea is to measure the systemic risk of a market with m companies by evaluating the interconnection of all m*(m-1) pairs in the market. A pair is regarded as interconnected if a Granger-causality relationship between the stock market returns of the two companies cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level.
Granger Causality Networks
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The systemic risk of the system is finally measured by the sum of pairs which are considered interconnected. The order of the pairs must be considered. Otherwise, the direction of the interconnection is ignored. Companies which Granger-cause stock market returns of many other companies contribute most to systemic risk. In addition, companies whose stock market returns are heavily influenced by the returns of other companies can be considered vulnerable.
Mathematically, Granger-causality can be described as follows:
where: and represent the time series of the stock market returns, whereas i and j indicate the two companies of a given pair. t stands for the time and ε indicates an error term.
, , , are the coefficients of the model. If is different from zero, then R Grangercauses R and if is different from zero, then Granger-causes . Mathematically, the indicator of Granger-causality is:
Finally, the number of Granger-causality connections used as a measure for the systemic risk contribution of a company is derived as:
where: represents the number of companies whose stock market returns are influenced by the stock market returns of company i. For the multivariate linear regressions regarding the first approach, the following model is used:
The notation is the same as for the models in Equations (13a) and (13b). Again, the number of considered independent variables is varying according to the model specifications.
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Data
The data used in this paper is entirely available from public sources. Table 2 : Description of the data used to generate the dependent and independent variables.
The samples of my analyses are based on the S&P 500 composite index; therefore, my initial samples consist of 500 companies. The advantage of not only focusing on financial institutions is that financial institutions which are not labeled as such are included as well.
The AIG case has proven that, from a systemic risk perspective, it is important to incorporate a very broad perspective, since it is not possible to conclude from the industry specification of a company that certain activities are not undertaken. 
Results
Results of the First Approach (Financial Support in 2008)
The first approach takes into account the financial support programs initiated during the financial crisis in 2008. It is evaluated whether sophisticated or simple systemic risk measures are more suitable to explain which institutions received financial support, as well as how much support these institutions received. This is against economic intuition, since this would imply that the lower the market capitalization of the company and the lower the book leverage ratio, the more likely it is that the company is systemically risky. The results can be explained by multicollinearity issues, since
Size and Debt, as well as Leverage and Debt, are variables which measure the size and leverage of an institution. Results for model thirteen, which only considers one size variable and one leverage variable, reveal that, ex post, the size and leverage of an institution are helpful in determining which institutions are contributing to systemic risk.
In model thirteen, as in model ten, Return is significant and negative. This could be expected and is in line with economic intuition. More specifically, during a crisis, the most systemically contributing companies have the most adverse stock market returns. All in all, Panel C of Table   3 indicates that SRISK is, ex post, able to identify the institutions which are contributing to systemic risk. In addition, the amount of debt and leverage ratios of an institution can be helpful as well.
I conduct a robustness test for a subsample, only considering financial services companies, to check if the sophisticated systemic risk measures might only be applicable in the context of the financial sector. explanatory power in all relevant models at a 1% level. In the case of financial services companies, the institutions whose stock returns are negatively correlated with the S&P 500 composite index seem to have a higher likelihood of contributing to systemic risk.
From the ex post perspective (Panel C of Table 8 ), the results for the full sample are similar to the ones for the subsample. SRISK seems to be the most suitable sophisticated systemic risk measure for indicating the institutions contributing to systemic risk, and Debt, in the case of simple measures. In contrast to the results of the full sample, though, Correlation still has explanatory power and the leverage variables seem to have no impact at all. One explanation for that could be that financial services companies, which are contributing to systemic risk, had to deleverage after the financial crisis, and therefore, ex post, contributing and non-contributing institutions had similar leverage ratios (Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014) . Table 7 in the Appendix. The sample (n = 37) only includes institutions which received financial support. The dependent variable is Amount in all models, indicating the amount of support a certain company received during the financial crisis. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Results regarding the constants are omitted.
Panel A of Regarding the simple systemic risk measures (models six to thirteen), the size variables Size All in all, sophisticated risk measures are more useful, ex post, in explaining the volume of financial support, than ex ante, but the simple systemic risk measures still have more explanatory power. A model which combines size and leverage variables is most suitable.
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As a robustness test, I conduct the same analyses for a subsample, only considering financial services companies. The results are presented in the Appendix (Table 9) 
Results of the Second Approach (Classification as SII in 2013)
The Table   5 .
In all models in which Debt is included, the variable is strongly significant and the pseudo R All in all, the results for the sophisticated systemic risk measures are much better for the subsample, than in the case of the full sample. This is not astonishing, since the measures have been developed mainly with the banking industry in mind, and therefore, are calibrated to deliver the best results in the case of banks. Other industries were not considered in the development, even though non-financial companies can also contribute to systemic risk.
Discussion
The results suggest that CoVaR is not able to correctly identify institutions which contribute to systemic risk ex ante or ex post, neither at the moment, nor during the financial crisis.
Besides its popularity, this result could be expected, since major shortcomings of this sophisticated risk measure are already pointed out in the literature. For example, Benoit et al. (2013) illustrate that an institution's CoVaR is proportional to its Value at Risk, and therefore, an institution's contribution to systemic risk is seen in isolation from the system. In addition, Löffler and Raupach (2013) dispute the usefulness of CoVaR, since an increase of an institution's idiosyncratic risk decreases its contribution to systemic risk, according to the risk measure.
For MES the results are nearly as poor as for CoVaR. Only from the ex ante perspective of 2013 does it seem to correctly identify institutions which contribute to systemic risk.
However, these results could be driven by the fact that some institutions have been already According to Benoit et al. (2013) , SRISK is a compromise of the too-big-to-fail and the toointerconnected-to-fail paradigm. The "interconnectedness" is considered via MES and its proportionality to its firm beta. At the same time, "size" is considered by the equity and debt levels of a company. However, this promising approach is only partially supported by my results. On the one hand, most of the time, SRISK can correctly identify the institutions which contribute to systemic risk. Out of 32 models which include SRISK as an independent variable, in 22 models, SRISK is significant and the models have at least a decent fit. On the other hand, in six models, SRISK is not significant, and what is much more important, in two models, it is misleading. In addition, the question remains if the results are mainly driven by one of the constituents of SRISK -equity, debt and MES -or indeed are the outcome of the composition.
The last sophisticated systemic risk measure I evaluate is the Granger-Causality Network. In general, the key statement of Billio et al. (2012) It is interesting that the market capitalization of a company is not the best indicator, but the total debt level of a company is. One explanation could be that the severity of spillover effects (i.e., interconnections in extreme conditions between institutions), are primarily driven by counterparty credit risk and not by market risks (e.g., equity and interest rate risks). The volatility of stock prices is even high in normal times.
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Therefore, extreme stock price movements are expected by the market and the financial system is robust towards them. In contrast, default rates are extremely low and the financial system never had to prove that it is stable, even when debt cannot be paid on a large scale.
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This puts the results for SRISK into perspective. As Benoit et al. (2013) suggest, SRISK is highly correlated to leverage and total liabilities. The goodness of fit of the models, including Debt, always exceeds the SRISK models. Consequently, the explanatory power of SRISK might be simply driven by debt.
However, total debt as reported in the balance sheets, as an indicator for systemic relevance, does have some shortcomings. For example, all off-balance sheet exposures are not considered.
25 E.g., between 1970 and 2005, the maximal loss within one week of the S&P 500 composite index was 22%. 26 E.g., according to Vazza and Kraemer (2013) , the S&P investment-grade default rates between 1981 and 2012 never exceeded 0.42%.
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Second, the results for the leverage variables (Leverage and Book) are very mixed. In models without the variable Debt, Leverage often has explanatory power. However, in models controlling for Debt, the explanatory power of Leverage is often not significant. Furthermore, Book has a negative algebraic sign in all models in which the variable is significant. This means that, on the one hand, leverage ratios are not very well suited to detect companies contributing to systemic risk and, on the other hand, low leverage ratios can be an indicator of systemic risk. These results are in sharp contrast to the majority view of regulators and academics who emphasize that leverage ratios are at least a good indicator for companies which are vulnerable to systemic risk (see, e.g., FSB, 2009; Baluch et al., 2011; Haldane, 2012; IAIS, 2013 ). An explanation for this result could be that the vulnerability and the contribution to systemic risk are indeed two different concepts: an institution vulnerable to systemic risk needs not necessarily contribute to it and vice versa. For example, a very small, highly leveraged bank is intuitively not very robust towards adverse market situations.
However, the leverage itself is not a good indicator, in this case, for a contribution to systemic risk, since the total debt level of the institution is small. Therefore, its impact on other institutions, in the case of a bankruptcy, is very limited. Another argument which can explain why the results for leverage variables are mixed is presented by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) . After the financial crisis of 2008 financial services institutions had to deleverage and put asset prices under pressure. As a consequence the amount of available credit shrank and systemic risk in the overall market went up. Therefore, according to the literature, it is possible that not so much the leverage of institutions contributes to systemic risk but a sudden deleveraging.
Third, comparing the fit of the models combining the sophisticated systemic risk measures with models combining the simple measures illustrates that simple measures are more powerful. Consequently, simple systemic risk measures can be regarded as more suitable to detect companies contributing to systemic risk than sophisticated systemic risk measures. One has to keep in mind, though, that this result is primarily due to Debt; other simple measures do not fare much better as their sophisticated counterparts.
As mentioned in Section 1, two main assumptions are made. First, regulators successfully of an institution to systemic risk is dependent on the state of the system, the usefulness of all current microprudential sophisticated risk measures has to be doubted, since none takes the state of the system into account.
Conclusion
In this paper, I empirically evaluate whether sophisticated risk measures or simple systemic risk measures are more suitable to detect institutions which contribute most to systemic risk. I use two approaches, which use different variables approximating the systemic relevance of an institution. In the first approach, I use information about which institutions received financial support during the financial crisis and what amount they received. In the second approach, the systemic relevance is approximated by the fact of whether or not an institution is currently regarded as systemically important by national or international supervisors. Finally, I regress the systemic relevance variables on the various sophisticated and simple systemic risk measures.
The results of the paper suggest that simple systemic risk measures are more suitable to detect institutions contributing to systemic risk than sophisticated ones. This finding holds true for an ex ante and ex post perspective, regarding the point in time when the dependent and independent variables are calculated. In addition, this finding is valid for a broad sample of diverse companies (companies included in the S&P 500 composite index), as well as for a sample only considering financial institutions (all S&P 500 composite index companies labeled as banks, insurers, real estate or financial services companies).
In particular, the total amount of debt of a company is the strongest indicator for systemic relevance, followed by its market capitalization. Interestingly, the results for the leverage variables are rather mixed. Leverage seems not to have such a strong impact, as currently assumed (see, e.g., FSB, 2009).
Among the sophisticated systemic risk measures, the best results are achieved for SRISK.
Most of the time, it can successfully indicate companies which received financial support during the financial crisis and companies which are regarded currently as contributing to systemic risk. However, in the case of explaining, ex ante, the amount of financial support each institution received in 2008, it is misleading. This is a meaningful finding, since SRISK combines market based information (via MES and market capitalization), as well as balance sheet information (debt), and shows that combining sophisticated and simple systemic risk measures might be a viable attempt to measure the systemic risk of institutions.
The results are of importance to academics and their choice of an adequate risk measure. Each sophisticated measure should at least have more explanatory power than the total amount of debt in determining companies contributing to systemic risk. Furthermore, the results can be of use for regulators assessing if an indicator based approach to identify systemically important institutions is sufficient or other measures should be considered as well. In my opinion, the regulatory discussion should focus more on the robustness of the financial system towards a systemic crisis, instead of focusing on institutions contributing to systemic risk.
Labeling institutions as systemically relevant might create the false impression that regulators or academics are able to do so correctly, and therefore, might create a risk of its own.
Despite the vast number of studies on measuring systemic risk and the last financial crisis, there is still a need for further research. Firstly, in this paper, the assumption is made that during the financial crisis, financial support was given to the institutions which were contributing most to systemic risk. This assumption is commonly made, but it has not been evaluated yet whether it is true in all regards. More importantly, there is no discussion if the billions of dollars for the bailout programs were spent effectively and whether the institutions really needed the financial support for keeping the financial system stable. Secondly, sophisticated risk measures currently under discussion, try to achieve additivity (i.e., the sum of the systemic risk contributions of each company within a system equals the systemic risk of the system). However, it is not clear whether feedback effects can be ruled out. Maybe the state of the system influences the systemic risk contribution of an institution as well. Finally, as illustrated in this paper, and by the discussion in the literature about systemic risk measures, there is still no commonly acceptable measure, approach or framework which can properly determine systemic risk. and GrangerOut 10% consider granger-causality relationships at a significance level of 1% and 10%. In the cases of the dependent variables Support and SII, logistic regression models are used. Models regarding the dependent variable Amount employ least square regressions. Wald statistics are shown in brackets for models one to six and thirteen to sixteen. In models seven to twelve t-statistics are displayed instead. ***, ** and * indicate a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Results regarding the constants are omitted.
